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NOTES 
EMERGING FROM DAIMLER’S SHADOW: 
REGISTRATION STATUTES AS A MEANS TO 




In 1999, an American family of four travelled from Utah to 
Atlantis, a luxurious Bahamian getaway, for a long-anticipated 
vacation.1  Off the shores of Paradise Island, Victor, a thirteen-
year-old boy, was snorkeling with his father and younger brother 
when a motorboat suddenly cut through the water and hit him.2  
Victor was airlifted to Florida, where he underwent medical 
treatment for massive injuries.3  He survived, but his arm had 
been severed, and he was permanently disfigured.4 
The motorboat operator conducted business at the Atlantis 
Hotel, owned by multinational corporations principally based in 
the Bahamas.5  Although the corporation attempted to hide 
behind its foreign citizenship, Victor and his family were able to 
hold the corporation accountable through an American court’s 
exercise of general jurisdiction.6 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2017, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2014, Union College. Recipient of the 
2017 John R. Brown Award for Excellence in Legal Writing. The author expresses 
warm gratitude to Professor Jane Scott for her guidance, insight, and mentorship. 





6 Id. at 1274. See also Catherine Wilson, Utah Family Allowed To Sue in Miami 
Over Bahamian Injury, FL. TIMES-UNION (Apr. 22, 2002, 6:15 PM), http://jackson 
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Today, however, under the framework of a modern Supreme 
Court that has “systematically restricted plaintiffs’ access to 
courts,”7 Victor and his family would have few avenues available 
to hold foreign corporations accountable in an American court.8  
Since the United States Supreme Court’s landmark holding in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,9 this restrictive methodology has been 
applied to general jurisdiction.10  In that case, the Court 
narrowed the ability of states to exercise general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations by applying a “proportionality” framework.11  
Now, a corporation must be considered “at home” in the forum 
state in order for general jurisdiction to be exercised.12  Still, the 
Court left open a significant opportunity that states should use in 
order to ensure corporate accountability: consent to general 
jurisdiction through business registration statutes.13  Several 
states, notably New York and Delaware, have long held that 
registering to do business within a state forms a contractual 
relationship whereby a corporation is obligated to submit to the 
jurisdiction of that state’s courts.14 
ville.com/tu-online/apnews/stories/042202/D7J27CG01.html. Victor’s story was not 
unique. In 2005, the same powerboat company was involved in the death of two-year 
old Paul Gallagher. See Lois Rogers, Bahamas Silent Over Boy’s Death, THE SUNDAY 
TIMES (London), (Apr. 3, 2005, 1:00 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bah 
amas-silent-over-boys-death-0mb565n7xbx (“The boat hit the sand and bounced over 
the heads of sunbathers . . . the vessel’s propeller sliced through Paul’s head. He 
died five days later.”). 
7 Case Comment, Personal Jurisdiction—General Jurisdiction—Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 315 (2014). 
8 Victor’s family could not afford litigation in a foreign forum and the Bahamas 
does not recognize jury trials for personal injury suits. See Wilson, supra note 6. 
9 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
10 See George Bundy Smith & Thomas J. Hall, General Jurisdiction in New York 
After ‘Daimler,’ N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 2014 (citing Chambers v. Weinstein, No. 
157781/2013, 2014 WL 4276910, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug. 22, 2014)); 
Natia Daviti, Daimler AG v. Bauman: A Change in the Climate of General 
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 40 WESTCHESTER B.J. 7, 11 (2015). 
11 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
12 Id. at 751 (majority opinion); Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919–20 (2011). 
13 See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 576 
(D. Del. 2015) (noting that Daimler does not address consent-based general 
jurisdiction), aff’d, 817 F.3d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. 
Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 n.15 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that a court could consider 
whether a corporation consented to jurisdiction through registration). 
14 See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Del. 1988). But see Genuine 
Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 127 (Del. 2016). See also Frummer v. Hilton Hotels 
Int’l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536, 227 N.E.2d 851, 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1967). 
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This Note argues for the increased exercise of general 
jurisdiction based on registration statutes.15  Carefully drafted 
state statutes, explicitly stating that corporations registering to 
do business in a state thereby consent to general jurisdiction, not 
only solve the consequences of Daimler, but also fully comport 
with traditional values of fairness. 
Part I outlines the jurisprudential history related to general 
jurisdiction.  Section A begins with the concept of territoriality 
introduced in Pennoyer and the minimum contacts analysis in 
International Shoe, then discusses the modern doctrine in 
Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear, culminating with Daimler.  
Section B outlines the jurisprudence of consent-based jurisdiction 
before Daimler.  Next, Part II addresses the consequences of 
Daimler and how lower courts have interpreted and implemented 
the decision.  Finally, Part III discusses statutory solutions. 
Section A summarizes legislation pending in New York that 
would codify consent-based jurisdiction.  Section B addresses the 
criticisms of consent to jurisdiction based on registration 
statutes.  Finally, Section C suggests improvements to legislation 
to ensure corporate accountability. 
I. BACKGROUND LAW
When a court determines whether it has jurisdiction over the 
parties to a civil action, it divides that analysis into two avenues: 
specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.16  Specific 
jurisdiction is based solely on the relationship between the forum 
state and the events giving rise to the cause of action and exists 
when those events occurred within the state.17  In contrast, 
general jurisdiction is based on the relationship between the 
forum state and one of the parties to the suit without regard to 
the geographical location of the dispute being litigated.18  The 
15 Similar to other works addressing this topic, this Note will not discuss the 
potential Interstate Commerce Clause issues related to registration statutes and 
general jurisdiction. See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General 
Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1362 n.106 
(2015). 
16 See Lea Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 721, 726 (1988). 
17 See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: 
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
18 See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 
627 (1988) (referring to general jurisdiction as “dispute-blind”). 
214 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:211   
authority of the state is a central feature of both forms of 
jurisdiction.  From the earliest articulations of personal 
jurisdiction, the sovereignty of the forum state has played a 
pivotal role.19 
A. General Jurisdiction: Pennoyer to Daimler
1. Historical Foundation: Pennoyer and International Shoe
The long-running debate over the definition and extent of
state authority over non-resident defendants was sparked in 
1877.  In Pennoyer v. Neff,20 the United States Supreme Court 
defined personal jurisdiction as limited to the territorial 
boundaries of the state.21  States remained all-powerful within 
their borders, but were limited in obtaining jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants.  For over sixty years territoriality reigned. 
Then, in 1945, a new Court began to adapt the doctrine to an 
evolving world. 
In International Shoe v. Washington,22 the Court addressed 
whether a state could adjudicate proceedings against a foreign 
corporation23 based only on activities of that corporation within 
the forum.24  The difficulty the Court wrestled with involved the 
personhood of a corporate entity.25  Although the fiction of 
corporate personhood had existed since the mid-19th century,26 
corporations differ from individuals in that they can be “present” 
in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously.27  Therefore, the Court 
19 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952). 
20 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
21 Id. at 729. Neff had hired John Mitchell, an attorney, to help obtain a land 
grant in Oregon. Id. at 715. Neff was ultimately successful in gaining the land, but 
Mitchell brought suit in Oregon for outstanding legal debts owed by Neff. Id. at 716. 
After Mitchell won a default judgment, he assigned the land to Pennoyer, resulting 
in this suit. Id. 
22 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
23 “Foreign corporation” refers to any corporation that comes into the state, but 
is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business there. In this sense, a 
foreign corporation could be from another country or merely from another state. 
24 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311. 
25 Id. at 316. 
26 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 650 (1819); Pembina 
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888); see 
also Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in 
the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 134 (2013). 
27 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314. International Shoe was incorporated in Delaware, 
with a principal place of business in Missouri. Id. at 313. 
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reasoned, it becomes necessary to examine the interactions that 
the corporation has with the state to determine if jurisdiction 
comports with constitutional due process.28  Even though there 
may be no express consent to be sued, the extended presence of a 
corporation within the forum based on certain minimum contacts 
with the state is enough to subject it to jurisdiction.29 
Such action satisfies due process because of a quid pro quo 
relationship.30  A corporation gains the privileges and protections 
of the state by operating within the state in exchange for the 
obligation to submit to the state’s judicial process.31  All that due 
process requires of an out-of-state defendant is that the entity 
have certain minimum contacts with the forum “such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’ ”32  Applying this test, the Court 
determined that International Shoe’s contacts with the state 
were “systematic and continuous,”33 and thus the corporation was 
amenable to suit. 
28 Id. at 316–17. 
29 Id. at 317. 
30 See Twitchell, supra note 18, at 621. 
31 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 422 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that as active
members in “interstate and foreign commerce,” corporations coming into the state
should be subjected to jurisdiction).
32 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)). 
33 Id. at 320. The suit revolved around a Washington tax on businesses to 
contribute to a state unemployment fund and arose out of the company’s contacts 
with the state of Washington. International Shoe had avoided the tax by not having 
a permanent business site. The Court determined that 11 to 13 employees renting 
space, selling products, and earning compensation was enough to establish 
jurisdiction. Id. The minimum contacts analysis is a test based on reasonableness: 
do the contacts between the corporation and the forum reach a minimum threshold 
where it would be fair to subject the corporation to suit? See World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). The minimum contacts 
analysis has been criticized over the decades following International Shoe for being 
“confusing,” “vague,” and “uncertain.” See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and 
Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 
189, 189 (1998). 
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While the holding has been expanded and clarified since the 
case was decided,34 International Shoe has remained the genesis 
of modern personal jurisdiction analysis.  However, the Court has 
been less effective in articulating the more specific scope of a 
state’s jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the cause of 
action is not related to the corporation’s activities within the 
state. 
2. Modern Doctrine: Perkins and Helicopteros
In the arena of modern general jurisdiction jurisprudence,
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.35 serves as the 
starting point.36  In Perkins, a shareholder of Benguet Mining 
sued the company in Ohio for actions unrelated to events in that 
state.37  Although the company originally operated in the 
Philippines, its operations halted after the Japanese invasion 
during World War II.38  During the Japanese occupation, the 
company’s president returned to his home in Ohio and ran the 
company from there.39  The Court held that subjecting a foreign 
corporation to the jurisdiction of Ohio under these circumstances 
comported with due process.40  The Court reasoned that the 
business done in Ohio was “sufficiently substantial” to justify 
jurisdiction.41  Therefore, it did not violate due process to hold the 
company amenable to suit in Ohio, even though the cause of 
action did not result from its activities in the forum.42 
34 For example, in Hanson v. Denckla, the Court explained that minimum 
contacts require “some act [of the corporation] by which the [corporation] 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958). 
35 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
36 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2014) (referring to Perkins as the 
“textbook case” for general jurisdiction in post-International Shoe jurisprudence). 
37 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439. Idonah Slade Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio and a 
stockholder in the Benguet Mining, brought suit seeking unpaid dividends and 
damages relating to those shares. Id. 
38 Id. at 447–48. 
39 Id. The company president maintained an office in Ohio, where he kept office 
files, distributed salary checks, maintained company funds in two bank accounts, 
and held several directors’ meetings. Id. at 448. 
40 Id. at 438. 
41 Id. at 447. 
42 Id. at 448. The difference between the International Shoe and Perkins 
analyses is the focus on where the cause of action arose in relation to the state. 
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Since Perkins, the case law governing general jurisdiction 
has been limited.43  It was not until 1984, in Helicopteros 
Nacionales v. Hall,44 that the Supreme Court laid out a limited 
rubric for establishing general jurisdiction.  In that case, a 
Colombian corporation, which provided helicopter transportation 
for oil and construction companies in South America, purchased 
helicopters from a Texas corporation.45  The contracts were 
negotiated in Texas, the helicopters were manufactured in Texas, 
and prospective pilots were trained in Texas.46  When an accident 
in Peru involving one of the helicopters killed four Americans, 
their families brought suit in Texas state courts.47 
In deciding whether jurisdiction over the foreign corporation 
could be asserted, the Court laid out a two-part test.48  First, a 
court must determine whether the defendant had “continuous 
and systematic” contacts with the forum.49  Second, a court must 
decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due 
process.50  Finding that the Colombian corporation’s contacts 
were not continuous and systematic, the Court held that 
extending jurisdiction over the corporation would not comport 
with due process.51  “[M]ere purchases” occurring regularly were 
not enough to give rise to a state’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction.52  This ruling exacerbated the confusion over the 
scope of general jurisdiction, leaving it unclear what facts and 
circumstances could demonstrate continuous and systematic 
activity.  For thirty years after Helicopteros, the confusion 
persisted. 
43 See Brilmayer et al., supra note 16, at 724 (noting that, at the time of 
publication,  only two Supreme Court cases since 1952 had discussed general 
jurisdiction, Perkins and Helicopteros). 
44 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
45 Id. at 409–10. 
46 Id. at 410–11. Despite these contacts, the corporation had never registered to 
do business in Texas and never appointed an agent for service of process. Id. at 411. 
47 Id. at 412. 
48 Id. at 415–16. This two-part test was an attempt to harmonize the pieces of 
the jurisdiction analysis explained in International Shoe and Perkins. See Perkins v. 
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
49 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. 
50 Id. at 418. 
51 Id. at 418–19. 
52 Id. at 418. 
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3. The Sea Change: Goodyear and Daimler
As lower courts began to interpret and apply the Supreme
Court’s general jurisdiction doctrine, it became clear that there 
was a lack of uniformity and understanding.53  To address that 
problem, the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases in 2011 and 
2014 to clarify the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants.54 
In 2011, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown,55 the Court began to refine the “continuous and 
systematic” contacts test for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
originally expressed in Perkins.56  In Goodyear, the families of 
two North Carolina teenagers brought suit against Goodyear Tire 
and its various foreign subsidiaries.57 
During a soccer tournament abroad, two teenagers died in a 
fatal bus accident in Paris caused by a defective tire 
manufactured by Goodyear Turkey.58  When suit was brought in 
North Carolina state courts, jurisdiction over the foreign 
companies was disputed.59  The trial court determined that it had 
general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries and the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.60  On appeal to the U.S.  
53 See Brilmayer et al., supra note 16, at 724; Twitchell, supra note 18, at 611, 
629. 
54 Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for: 
Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. 
ONLINE 2001, 2002 (2014) (arguing that while academia hoped the U.S. Supreme 
Court would clarify the general jurisdiction analysis, Goodyear and Daimler should 
have been decided on narrower grounds). 
55 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
56 Id. at 919; see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 
(1952). 
57 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. Named in the suit were Goodyear Luxembourg, 
Goodyear Turkey, and Goodyear France, all incorporated and having their principal 
places of business in those countries. Id. None of the subsidiaries were registered to 
do business in North Carolina. Id. at 921. However, Goodyear USA, an Ohio 
corporation, was registered to do business in North Carolina and never questioned 
jurisdiction. Id. at 920–21. 
58 Id. at 920. 
59 Id. at 919. Jurisdiction was disputed because the foreign subsidiaries lacked 
the “continuous and systematic” contacts with North Carolina that would have made 
jurisdiction proper. Id. at 919–20. 
60 Id. at 921–22. 
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Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg accused the North Carolina 
courts of “[c]onfusing or blending general and specific 
jurisdictional inquiries.”61 
Clarifying the test for general jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote that a state may only exercise general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations “when their affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum State.”62  Under this test, North Carolina did 
not have jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries, because they 
could not be considered “at home” in the state.63  While the Court 
may have intended this new “at home” test to clear the murky 
waters of general jurisdiction, confusion persisted. 
In 2014, the Supreme Court again attempted to refine the 
framework for general jurisdiction by clarifying Goodyear’s “at 
home” rubric.64  The chosen suit, though, involved foreign 
plaintiffs taking advantage of U.S. law to sue foreign defendants 
over foreign events and, as a result, was a poor vehicle for 
reform.  After the death of long-time Argentine president Juan 
Peron in 1974, a political vacuum resulted in a power struggle 
that plunged the country into chaos.65  From 1974 to 1983, the 
Argentine Military Government orchestrated an epoch of state 
terrorism, hunting down political opponents, academics, lawyers, 
and sympathizers.66  The official death count of the “Dirty War” is 
9,000, but human rights groups have estimated as many as 
30,000 victims.67 
61 Id. at 919–20. The North Carolina court relied on a “stream of commerce” 
theory, whereby jurisdiction is gained over a corporation due to its purposeful 
placement of products in the forum state. Id. at 920. However, Justice Ginsburg 
noted that the “stream of commerce” theory only applies to the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction. Id. at 927. Therefore, states have an interest in adjudicating matters 
caused by foreign corporations purposefully targeting products to the forum state or 
reasonably foreseeing the products eventually reaching the forum. Id. at 926–27; see 
also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
62 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. 
63 Id. at 929. 
64 See Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General Personal 
Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 82–83 (2013). 
65 See PATRICIA MARCHAK & WILLIAM MARCHAK, GOD’S ASSASSINS: STATE 
TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA IN THE 1970S 120–22 (1999). 
66 See RICHARD MORROCK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE AND VIOLENT 
OPPRESSION: A STUDY OF MASS CRUELTY FROM NAZI GERMANY TO RWANDA 184 
(2010). 
67 See Jorge Rafael Videla, Death of a ‘Dirty War’ Criminal, ECONOMIST: 
AMERICAS VIEW (May 23, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/amer 
icasview/2013/05/jorge-rafael-videla. 
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Two decades later, a group of victims and relatives brought 
suit against DaimlerChrysler under the United States’ Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victims Protection Act 
(“TVPA”)68 in California.69  The plaintiffs contended that 
Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, had collaborated 
with the Argentine military and police forces to intimidate, 
kidnap, and murder union agitators.70  The question presented by 
this unusual case was whether the court could constitutionally 
exercise jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California 
contacts of its subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, for alleged crimes 
by the Argentine subsidiary.71  The District Court for the 
Northern District of California held that it could not.72 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, deciding that jurisdiction was 
reasonable and articulating three justifications.73  First, Daimler 
had injected itself into California courts by initiating lawsuits 
there for years.74  Second, as an international corporation, 
Daimler would not be overly burdened by litigating in 
California.75  Third, California had an interest in the suit because 
Daimler had inserted itself into the California market and 
because the United States generally maintains an interest in 
redressing international human rights violations.76  Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the exercise of general jurisdiction 
was proper. 
68 Both statutes provide a cause of action for certain violations of international 
human rights, stressing the United States’ interest in providing a forum for redress. 
See Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Torture 
Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392–93 
(2008). 
69 See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
70 Id. at 912. 
71 Id. at 913–14, 919. 
72 Id. at 917–18. 
73 Id. at 931. 
74 Id. at 925. Daimler had initiated lawsuits in California courts to challenge the 
state’s clean air laws and to protect its own patents and business interests. Id. at 
917. Moreover, Daimler had retained permanent counsel within the state. Id. at 918.
75 Id. at 926 (citing Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir.
1988)). 
76 Id. at 925 (“[T]he sale of DCAG’s vehicles in California ‘is not an isolated
occurrence but arises from the efforts of DCAG to serve the California market.’ ”); see 
id. at 927. 
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In Daimler AG v. Bauman,77 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed.78  The Court framed the issue as whether 
California was precluded from exercising general jurisdiction 
“given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, 
perpetrators, or victims.”79  Answering in the affirmative, the 
Court clarified language from Goodyear.80  Justice Ginsberg 
explained that while a corporation’s place of incorporation and 
principal place of business are not the only forums that satisfy 
the “at home” test for general jurisdiction, those locations are the 
“paradigm all-purpose forums.”81 
The Court stressed predictability.  If Daimler could be sued 
in California for a case originating in Argentina, then the 
corporation could be sued in any state in which its subsidiaries’ 
sales were “sizeable.”82  And if that were the case, corporations 
would never be able to conduct their affairs “with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 
liable to suit.”83  Therefore, the proper analysis to determine 
whether a corporation is essentially “at home” in the forum state 
is to compare its contacts with the forum with its relative 
contacts globally.84 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Sotomayor disagreed 
with the Court’s reasoning.85  Concerned that the Court was 
essentially uprooting personal jurisdiction precedent and due 
process jurisprudence,86 Justice Sotomayor characterized the 
majority’s approach as determining “not that Daimler’s contacts 
with California [were] too few, but that its contacts with other 
forums [were] too many.”87  She charged that, by adopting such 
an approach, the Court had discarded “the lodestar” of personal 
77 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
78 Id. at 751. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 760 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 923–24 (2011). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 761. 
83 Id. at 762 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
(1985)). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing it is a “commercial reality” that corporations may 
be amenable to suit in many states). 
84 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. 
85 Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
86 Id. at 764. 
87 Id. 
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jurisdiction analysis: “[I]f the defendant has sufficiently taken 
advantage of the State’s laws,” the “State may subject the 
defendant to the burden of suit.”88  Therefore, she argued, a 
defendant’s contacts outside the forum have always been, and 
should have remained, immaterial.89 
Instead, Justice Sotomayor took a different approach. 
Foremost in her analysis was the concept of reciprocal fairness. 
After all, it simply cannot be fair for a corporation to avail itself 
of the forum and then immunize itself from suit therein.90  
Moreover, the majority’s approach actually diminished the 
predictability that had always been a centerpiece of jurisdiction 
analyses, because it created an uncertain comparison framework 
between the corporation’s forum contacts and its global 
contacts.91  Finally, there is nothing unpredictable about a rule 
forcing multinational corporations to be prepared for suit in any 
forum with which they have substantial contacts.92 
Further, Justice Sotomayor reiterated the importance of a 
state’s sovereignty in regulating corporations within its 
boundaries.93  She charged that, by ignoring this principle, the 
Court had defined general jurisdiction “so narrowly and 
arbitrarily as to contravene the States’ sovereign prerogative” to 
hold corporations accountable.94  In Justice Sotomayor’s view, the 
policy concerns that the majority addressed should be left to the 
individual state legislatures to resolve.95 
88 Id. 
89 Id.; see also Judy M. Cornett and Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye 
Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 104 (2015) (arguing that “Daimler departs from settled law”). 
90 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 768 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 319 (1945)); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 16, at 742 (“We should not 
treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they carry on more 
substantial business in other states.”). 
91 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (“[T]he majority does not even try to explain 
just how extensive the company’s in-state contacts must be in the context of its 
global operations in order for general jurisdiction to be proper.”). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 772. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 771; see also Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 28 (1989) (“Territorial sovereignty exists and is a reasonable basis for
state power.”).
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Finally, she argued, the majority approach would insulate 
massive international corporations while simultaneously 
punishing smaller domestic companies.96  Under the majority’s 
framework, a small business operating solely in California, but 
producing a fraction of Daimler’s production, could be held liable 
in a California court, while Daimler could not.97  Thus, she 
reasoned, the Daimler majority had made goliath corporations, 
known in a different context as “too big to fail,”98 also “too big for 
general jurisdiction.”99 
Daimler v. Bauman was meant to finally clarify the 
unanswered questions surrounding general and specific 
jurisdiction and the appropriate instances in which both may be 
invoked.100  However, there is a crucial area that has not been 
addressed.101  Consent-based jurisdiction, whereby a state may 
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant based on an authorizing 
state statute, is one of the last open questions in this juridical 
realm and a powerful tool to remedy the restrictions on general 
jurisdiction imposed by Daimler. 
B. Consent-Based Jurisdiction: Pre-Daimler
Ancillary to its general jurisdiction analysis, the U.S.
Supreme Court has long relied on the “doing business” test to 
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction, whereby a corporation 
is amenable to suit in the forum state based on its registration to 
conduct business in that state.102  For a century, the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have articulated the necessity and 
legitimacy of this avenue to jurisdiction.  This theory of express 
96 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772. 
97 Id. While car production itself had nothing to do with the cause of action, the 
manufacturing of cars in California helped establish Daimler’s contacts with the 
forum. Id. 
98 “Too big to fail” refers to a corporation so large that the national economy 
depends on it. Therefore, it cannot fail because a domino effect would ensue. See 
Catherine Rampell, Defining “Too Big to Fail,” N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX BLOG (Aug. 
20, 2009, 5:08 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/defining-too-big-
to-fail. 
99 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
100 See Case Comment, supra note 7, at 311. 
101 See Linda J. Silberman, Daimler AG v. Bauman: A New Era for Judicial 
Jurisdiction in the United States 237 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Papers, Paper No. 522, 2015), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/522 (listing significant 
questions left open by Daimler, including consent based on registration statutes). 
102 See Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 
1990) (defining the “doing business” test under New York C.P.L.R. § 301). 
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consent is based on the state’s interest in keeping corporations 
accountable, as well as honoring the contract developed between 
the state and the corporation through the latter’s registration to 
conduct business in the former. 
1. Early Twentieth-Century Application
As corporations grew at the onset of the twentieth century,
so did public concern over their power and “seeming ability to 
swallow or to ruin effective competitors and to control consumer 
prices at will.”103  Moreover, with corporations expanding across 
state borders, courts sensed a social duty to ensure fairness.104  In 
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue 
Mining and Milling Co.,105 Justice Holmes articulated the 
legitimacy of a state’s regulation of corporations operating within 
its borders, drawing on New York case law.106  In Pennsylvania 
Fire, an Arizona company purchased an insurance policy for 
buildings in Colorado, and then brought suit against the insurer 
in Missouri.107  The insurance company argued that its 
registration to do business in Missouri made it amenable only to 
suits arising out of its Missouri contracts.108  The court disagreed, 
holding that the exercise of jurisdiction was valid because the 
company had consented to suit by registering to do business.109  
While the court conceded that consent may be a “mere fiction,” it  
103 See Leroy G. Dorsey, Theodore Roosevelt and Corporate America, 1901-1909: 
A Reexamination, 25 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 725, 732 (1995). 
104 See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: 
The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 
77 VA. L. REV. 603, 603 (1991); see also Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201 
N.J. 48, 61 (2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 
(2011) (recounting the history of the expansion of general jurisdiction in relation to 
economic growth). 
105 243 U.S. 93 (1917). 
106 Id. at 95, 97. 
107 Id. at 94. Suit could properly be brought in Missouri, despite the contract at 
issue being executed in Colorado, because the defendant had formed a contract with 
the state. Id. In exchange for the privilege of doing business with Missouri, its 
Missouri Insurance Superintendant would accept service on its behalf, thus 
authorizing general jurisdiction. See Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A 
Unifying and Coherent Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
97, 138 n.130 (1992). 
108 Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila., 243 U.S. at 94–95 (1917). 
109 Id. at 95. 
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was justified because it placed the out-of-state corporation on the 
same footing as a local corporation operating within the state 
borders.110 
During the same period, New York courts, and especially the 
New York Court of Appeals under Chief Judge Cardozo’s 
leadership, played a unique role as proponents of broad general 
jurisdiction.111  Two seminal cases from this era, both authored 
by Chief Judge Cardozo, articulate New York’s long-standing 
support for corporate accountability.  In Bagdon v. Philadelphia 
& Reading Coal & Iron,112 a New York resident brought suit 
against a Pennsylvania company after he was injured while 
working in Pennsylvania.113  The company sought to avoid 
jurisdiction by arguing that it was only accountable for actions 
occurring within New York.114  Noting that New York requires 
foreign corporations to obtain a certificate in order to conduct 
business within the state,115  Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that 
this registration creates a contract between the state and the 
company: the privilege of doing business is received in exchange  
110 Id. at 96; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
111 Chief Judge Cardozo has been referred to as the “ultimate scholar judge.” He 
served eighteen years on the New York Court of Appeals before being appointed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1932. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Process 
of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 263, 264 (1992). Chief Judge Cardozo developed 
a strong record of regulating corporate behavior during this period. See, e.g., Globe 
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918) (conflict of 
interest in corporate contracts); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 
58 (1926) (piercing the corporate veil); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 
545 (1928) (fiduciary duty owed partners). Because it is focused on his work while 
serving on the New York Court of Appeals, this Note refers to Cardozo as “Chief 
Judge.”  See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Benjamin Nathaniel Cardozo: The Teacher, 16 
Cardozo L. Rev. 2415, 2417 (1995) (“Though he earned the title Associate Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court, I know you will not mind that I refer to him as 
the Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, the title New Yorkers 
affectionately cherish the most, because it is associated with his eighteen years of 
service and leadership on our great common law tribunal.”). 
112 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916). 
113 Id. at 433, 111 N.E. at 1075. The company also made a contract to 
compensate the worker, but subsequently reneged on that agreement. Id., 111 N.E. 
at 1075. 
114 Id. at 433–34, 111 N.E. at 1075. 
115 Id. at 436, 111 N.E. at 1076. 
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for submitting to jurisdiction.116  Therefore, New York had 
jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania company even though the 
cause of action had no relation to transactions within the state.117 
Just one year later, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the 
extension of jurisdiction.  In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal,118 a 
New York resident brought suit against a Pennsylvania coal 
company.119  In addressing the state’s jurisdictional authority, 
Chief Judge Cardozo conducted a minimum contacts analysis 
nearly three decades before the United States Supreme Court 
would adopt such a test in International Shoe.120 
Chief Judge Cardozo began the analysis by noting that 
process had been served on an appointed agent, unlike in Tauza, 
where process had been served on an officer of the defendant 
corporation.121  Yet, according to Chief Judge Cardozo, service on 
an agent similarly satisfied the test for state jurisdiction.  All 
that need be determined is “that the corporation is here.”122  To 
Chief Judge Cardozo, this was simple fairness.123  Whether that 
defined agent is an officer of the corporation or a state official 
makes no difference.124  If the corporation “is here”—that is, if it 
is taking advantage of the privileges and protections of the 
state—then the state has jurisdiction over the corporation, 
regardless of where the cause of action arose.125 
As a consequence of economic globalization, New York state 
courts relied on Tauza and Bagdon to provide justice for state 
residents.126  Decades later, in Bryant v. Finnish National 
116 Id. at 437, 111 N.E. at 1076; see also Brilmayer, supra note 95 at 17–21. 
117 Bagdon, 217 N.Y. at 438, 111 N.E. at 1077. Other states had reached the 
same conclusion. Id., 111 N.E. at 1077 (citing Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 
432 (Mass. 1882); Reeves v. S. Ry. Co., 49 S.E. 674 (Ga. 1905)). 
118 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). 
119 Id. at 265, 115 N.E. at 916. 
120 See id., 115 N.E. at 916; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945). 
121 Compare Bagdon, 217 N.Y. at 433, 111 N.E. at 1075, with Tauza, 220 N.Y. at 
268–69, 115 N.E. at 918. 
122 Tauza, 220 N.Y. at 268, 115 N.E. at 918. 
123 Id. at 269, 115 N.E. at 918; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 
771 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the task of weighing policy 
concerns belongs to legislators). 
124 Tauza, 220 N.Y. at 268, 115 N.E. at 918. Both cases involved New York’s 
General Corporation Law. Id., 115 N.E. at 918. 
125 Id., 115 N.E. at 918. 
126 See, e.g., Elish v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 305 N.Y. 267, 112 N.E.2d 842 (1953); 
Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). 
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Airlines,127 a New York resident brought suit against a Finnish 
airline for an accident caused by the corporation’s negligence in 
Paris.128  Relying on Tauza, the Court of Appeals held that the 
Finnish corporation was amenable to suit in New York based on 
its compliance with the business registration statute and its 
active business contacts within the state.129  The court reasoned 
that the test for exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
“should be a simple pragmatic one.”130 
These cases make up New York’s century-old tradition of 
consent-based jurisdiction, demonstrating a judicial response to 
ensure fairness.  By protecting the powers of the legislature to 
hold corporations accountable, New York has set a standard for 
ensuring that state residents may bring causes of action against 
foreign corporations that avail themselves of the forum. 
2. The Federal Circuit Courts and Consent-Based Jurisdiction
Pre-Daimler
While New York’s highest court was defining the scope of
consent-based jurisdiction, federal courts were also wrestling 
with this theory of extending general jurisdiction.  In the decades 
preceding Daimler, commentators split on the legitimacy of 
basing general jurisdiction on business registration statutes as 
well as the overall scope of general jurisdiction.131  Between 1971 
and 2008, most federal circuits found occasion to rule on this 
question.132  The result has been a three-way split among the 
Circuits.  The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have held that 
business registration statutes are a valid means of establishing a 
127 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965). 
128 Id. at 428–29, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626. The plaintiff was 
struck by a baggage cart that was blown by an “excessive blast of air” from one of the 
defendant’s aircrafts. Id. at 429, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626. 
129 Id. at 428, 431, 208 N.E.2d at 439, 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 626, 628. Bryant 
essentially applied a two-part recipe for jurisdiction: the registration to do business 
plus the sufficient contacts between the corporation and the state. This analysis is 
best suited for consent-based jurisdiction. See infra Part III, Section C. 
130 See Bryant, 15 N.Y.2d at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 629. 
131 See Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 807, 809 (2004) (outlining different theories on the scope of general 
jurisdiction). 
132 See Takeda GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., Civ. Action No.: 15-3384 
(FLW)(DEA), 2016 WL 146443, at *3 (D. N.J. Jan. 12, 2016) (discussing the circuit 
split as to whether consent-by-registration remains a viable basis for general 
jurisdiction). 
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corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction.133  The Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits have held that a state may condition general 
jurisdiction on registration statutes; however, the registration 
statutes in question in those cases were not sufficiently specific 
to grant consent.134  Finally, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
have held that a state registration requirement cannot provide a 
corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction.135  These cases 
reveal the importance of the specific statutory language and the 
necessity of some activity in addition to registration. 
a. The First Circuit: Consent Authorizes Jurisdiction
In Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc.,136 the First Circuit
determined that as long as a cause of action was within the scope 
of the agent’s authority, the corporation had consented to 
jurisdiction based on its registration to do business.137  In that 
case, a New Hampshire resident brought suit against his 
employer, a Vermont corporation, for injuries he sustained on a 
New Hampshire construction site.138  Pursuant to New 
Hampshire’s long-arm statute, plaintiff served process on the 
corporation’s in-state agent,139 but the District Court of New 
Hampshire dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.140  
Subsequently, the First Circuit reversed.141 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the First Circuit 
determined that New Hampshire’s long-arm statute was 
sufficiently broad to encompass jurisdiction based on the 
separate business registration statute.142  The court reasoned 
that if the New Hampshire legislature had intended to restrict 
133 See, e.g., Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1984); 
Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. 
900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990). 
134 See, e.g., Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 
1992); King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011). 
135 See, e.g., Ratcliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. 
Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990). 
136 739 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1984). 
137 Id. at 697. 
138 Id. at 696. 
139 Id. at 696 n.1. 
140 Id. at 696. 
141 Id. The opinion was authored by Justice Potter Stewart, retired and sitting 
by designation. See E. Jon A. Gryskiewicz, The Semi-Retirement of Senior Supreme 
Court Justices: Examining Their Service on the Courts of Appeals, 11 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 285, 295 (2015). 
142 Holloway, 739 F.2d at 697–98. 
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the applicability of the provision, it would have done so.143  The 
statute did not require that the cause of action occur within the 
state; in fact, earlier language imposing such a requirement had 
been deliberately removed by the legislature.144  Therefore, the 
court held that the clear language of the statute ensured that the 
exercise of general jurisdiction was constitutional.145 
b. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits: Consent Alone Is Not Enough
Other circuit courts, construing different statutes, have
determined that registering to do business alone is not sufficient 
to grant general jurisdiction.  In Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman), 
Ltd.,146 the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that 
Holiday Inns, a Tennessee corporation, had consented to general 
jurisdiction through its registration to do business in Indiana.147  
Registering to do business was a “necessary precursor” to 
conducting business in Indiana and, standing alone, could not act 
as authorization for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.148  The 
Indiana registration statute never mentioned the state’s exercise 
of jurisdiction.149  Therefore, jurisdiction would require 
registration plus some greater activity within the forum.150 
The Ninth Circuit took up the validity of consent-based 
jurisdiction in 2011, in King v. American Family Mutual 
Insurance.151  There, a Wisconsin insurance company 
contemplated expanding its business to Montana.152  Comporting 
with Montana law, the company registered to do business in the 
state as part of its exploration.153  However, it never actually 
143 Id. at 697. Justice Stewart noted that the legislature had, in fact, restricted 
the language in other statutes, including Subsection IV of the long-arm statute. Id. 
144 Id. at 699. 
145 Id. The Eighth Circuit has held that designating an agent for service of 
process through state business statutes is one of the most “solidly established ways” 
of providing consent to jurisdiction. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 
1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990). 
146 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990). 
147 Id. at 1241. 
148 Id. at 1245. 
149 Id. 
150 Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1245. 
151 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011). 
152 Id. at 572. 
153 Id. 
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conducted any business in Montana.154  When Colorado residents 
brought suit against the company in Montana following a 
motorcycle accident there, the district court dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because the company had never issued policies in 
Montana.155  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.156 
The court reasoned that the exercise of general jurisdiction 
was improper because the insurance company had “done nothing 
more than dip its toe in the water.”157  The state’s interest in 
corporate oversight does not exist if the corporation is not 
invoking the privileges of conducting business in the state.158  In 
short, the quid pro quo relationship relied on in previous cases 
simply did not exist.159  Therefore, registering to do business 
alone, without some greater activity within the state, was not 
enough to justify general jurisdiction.160 
As this survey of decisions has shown, lower courts were 
unable to agree on the legitimacy of basing general jurisdiction 
on business registration statutes in the period before Daimler.  
The resulting three-way split among the Circuits has continued 
to muddy the waters after Daimler, making the need for explicit 
registration statutes apparent. 
II. CONSENT-BASED JURISDICTION: POST-DAIMLER
Since Daimler, lower courts have relied on registration 
statutes as one way of asserting general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations.161  These statutes, enacted by state legislatures, 
provide a valuable tool for courts.  In essence, the statutes 
require that a corporation register to do business with the state 
154 Id. The court considered the insurance company “99.99% ‘Montana free.’ ” 
Id.; see also Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting 
Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 24 (1990). 
155 King, 632 F.3d at 573. 
156 Id. at 580. 
157 Id. at 572. 
158 See id. The precedent cited by the court rested on the state courts’ 
interpretation of governing state statutes. See Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold 
Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917); Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. 
Jeffrey Co., 251 U.S. 373, 379 (1920) (holding that New York’s registration statute 
only applied to corporations actually conducting business in New York). 
159 See King, 632 F.3d at 575. 
160 Id. at 580. 
161 See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND. 
L. REV. EN BANC 197, 202 (2014) (concluding that lower courts will continue to find
creative methods of establishing general jurisdiction).
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to obtain permission to conduct business in the state.162  Part of 
registering involves the corporation consenting to the state’s 
exercise of general jurisdiction in future litigation.163  Therefore, 
consent-based jurisdiction represents the foundation of personal 
jurisdiction case law: a quid pro quo agreement between the 
foreign corporation, which gains the privileges and protections of 
the state, and the forum state, which gains the right to hold 
those operating within its borders accountable.164 
A. Vera v. Republic of Cuba: New York’s Tradition of Consent-
Based Jurisdiction
After Daimler, courts began reexamining their traditional
framework of consent-based general jurisdiction.165  A pointed 
example involved foreign banks that had registered to do 
business in New York.  Vera v. Republic of Cuba166 dealt with two 
U.S. citizens bringing suit against Cuba under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).167  One plaintiff alleged that 
the Cuban regime extra-judicially killed her brother after a sham 
trial in 1960.168  The other alleged that agents of the Castro 
regime sentenced his father to death in absentia and 
assassinated him in 1976.169  Both were granted judgments from  
162 See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 436–37, 111 
N.E. 1075, 1076 (1916). 
163 See Rockefeller Univ. v. Ligand Pharms., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (explaining registration to do business as consent to jurisdiction). 
164 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (reasoning 
that obtaining protections and benefits from the forum make it “presumptively not 
unreasonable” to submit to jurisdiction). 
165 See Marshall Fishman & David Y. Livshiz, Do Recent Southern District 
Decisions Undo ‘Daimler’?, N.Y. L.J.: OUTSIDE COUNSEL (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202728945298/Do-Recent-Southern-
District-Decisions-Undo-Daimler?slreturn=20170312130306 (explaining that recent 
decisions “demonstrate the reluctance of lower courts to apply such a restrictive 
approach to general jurisdiction”). 
166 91 F. Supp. 3d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
167 Id. at 563–64. The purpose of FSIA was “to endorse and codify the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity” and to transfer to the courts responsibility for 
deciding immunity claims of foreign states. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 
313 (2010). 
168 Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 40 F. Supp. 3d 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(determining plaintiffs’ state court judgments were entitled to full faith and credit). 
169 Id. at 371. 
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a Florida Circuit Court and sought to execute those judgments 
against Cuban assets transferred through the defendant banks in 
New York.170 
The defendant banks argued that, under Daimler, New York 
lacked jurisdiction because the events at the center of the 
litigation occurred outside of the state and the banks could not be 
considered “at home” in the forum.171  Plaintiffs argued that 
under New York Banking Law § 200(a), a foreign bank must 
register to conduct business in the state, thereby providing 
jurisdiction.172  The court held that the foreign banks consented 
to the “necessary regulatory oversight in return for permission to 
operate in New York” and thus subjected themselves to the 
court’s general jurisdiction.173 
In his decision, Judge Hellerstein emphasized principles 
similar to those propounded by Justice Sotomayor in her Daimler 
concurrence.174  First, the district court reasoned that Daimler 
cannot be read so broadly as to prohibit any oversight over 
foreign actors.175  The court observed that foreign corporations 
doing business in New York should not receive preferential 
treatment over domestic banks, but instead must be bound by 
the same rules.176 
Additionally, the court noted that New York has routinely 
held foreign corporations accountable through applications of 
general jurisdiction under a consent-based justification.177  While 
Daimler may have cast doubt on that practice,178 the decision 
never explicitly outlawed it.179  Finally, the authorization of 
jurisdiction stems from the contractual relationship between the 
170 Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 564. 
171 Id. The Banco Bilbao was neither incorporated in New York nor had its 
principal place of business there. Id. at 570. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 571. 
174 Compare id. at 570 with Daimler AG. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 768–69 
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
175 Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 571. 
176 Id. at 570. The court compared the foreign corporation’s action to a legitimate 
business that launders money in its back room. Id. at 571. 
177 Id. at 566. 
178 Id. (noting that Daimler casts doubt on the “doing business” analysis); see 
also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.18 (majority opinion). 
179 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 n.15 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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forum state and the foreign corporation.180  If a corporation 
registers to do business within the state, it cannot then decide 
that it would prefer not to be hauled into that state’s courts.181  
Therefore, the court concluded, New York properly exercised 
jurisdiction over the foreign banks.182 
B. The Challenges Courts Face with Consent Statutes Post-
Daimler
Not all courts have been so willing to adapt the consent-
based justification to a post-Daimler landscape.  Many courts 
have taken the opinion at face value, assuming that “at home” 
refers only to the corporation’s principal place of business or state 
of incorporation.  In addition, some courts have been stymied by 
the lack of explicit language in state statutes.183 
For example, in McCourt v. A.O. Smith Water Products 
Co.,184 James McCourt and his wife, Mabel, residents of Florida, 
brought a tort action against a number of manufacturing 
corporations for injuries arising from asbestos exposure.185  The 
McCourts sued in federal court in New Jersey, and the defendant 
corporation filed a motion to dismiss.186  Unable to show that the 
corporation was essentially “at home” in New Jersey,187 the 
McCourts contended that the corporation consented to 
jurisdiction when it registered to do business in New Jersey.188   
180 Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (noting that the benefits associated with a 
foreign bank operating in New York “give rise to commensurate, reciprocal 
obligations”). 
181 Id. at 571 (“When corporations receive the benefits of operating in this forum, 
it is critical that regulators and courts continue to have the power to compel 
information concerning their activities.”). 
182 Id. 
183 See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 767 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that Daimler did not overrule 
precedent establishing that a corporation may consent to general jurisdiction 
through a registration statute). 
184 Civ. Act. No. 14-221, 2015 WL 4997403 (D. N.J. Aug. 20, 2015). See also 
Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, Civ. Act. No. 16-583, 2016 WL 1644451, at *6 (D. 
N.J. Apr. 25, 2016) (holding that the court could not exercise general jurisdiction 
because the New Jersey registration statute did not explicitly grant that authority). 
185 McCourt, 2015 WL 4997403, at *1. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at *3 (noting that the corporation maintained no bank accounts in the 
forum, did not own any property, leased only two office spaces, and had only 30 
employees in the state compared to its 63,000 nationwide). 
188 Id. 
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The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
registering to do business alone could not be considered 
consent.189 
The district court relied on Third Circuit precedent 
establishing a long tradition of general jurisdiction based on 
registration statutes.190  The seminal case, Bane v. Netlink, 
Inc.,191 held that a foreign corporation registered to do business in 
Pennsylvania had consented to Pennsylvania’s exercise of 
general jurisdiction.192  However, while the McCourt court 
recognized that Bane remained good law even after Daimler,193 it 
nonetheless distinguished the facts in that case from those in 
McCourt.194  Because New Jersey lacked an explicit statute 
authorizing courts to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations registered to do business in the state, as had existed 
in Pennsylvania, Bane could not be applied.195  Without that 
explicit grant, the court was powerless. 
The District of Oregon faced a similar dilemma in Lanham v. 
Pilot Travel Centers, LLC.196  An Oregon resident brought suit 
against a Delaware company when he tripped over a block of 
concrete at one of the company’s locations in Idaho.197  While the 
corporation’s contacts with Oregon were continuous, they did not 
reach the “at home” threshold.198  Therefore, the plaintiff 
alternatively argued that the corporation consented to Oregon’s 
general jurisdiction when it registered to do business there.199 
189 Id. at *4. 
190 Id. 
191 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991). 
192 Id. at 641. 
193 McCourt, 2015 WL 4997403, at *4. 
194 Id. Regardless of the general jurisdiction analysis, it does not seem that the 
McCourts had a particularly strong case. 
195 Id.; see also Bane, 925 F.2d at 641. 
196 No. 03:14-cv-01923-HZ, 2015 WL 5167268 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2015). 
197 Id. at *1. 
198 Id. at *4. The corporation maintained 550 travel centers across North 
America, including ten in Oregon. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the 
defendant employed 521 employees in Oregon and owned real property within the 
state, but never derived more than 2% of its revenue from Oregon business. Id. at 
*1.
199 Id. Plaintiff argued business registration statutes provided “an independent 
method of establishing personal jurisdiction,” while defendant argued that consent is 
no longer a valid analysis for general jurisdiction post-Daimler. Id. at *4. 
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The court noted the difficulty of resolving the issue in the 
absence of any post-Daimler federal appellate cases on the 
subject and in view of the conflicting district court decisions.200  
Still, the court determined that consent would be a valid 
justification for general jurisdiction if a state statute explicitly 
authorized it.201  Accordingly, a court must first look to the “plain 
language” of the statute as enacted by the legislature and, if that 
is insufficient, to the interpretation of the statute by state 
courts.202  For that reason, the court in in Lanham rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument. 
More recently, the Second Circuit grappled with these same 
issues.  In Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,203 the court faced the 
“nettlesome and increasingly contentious question” of consent to 
general jurisdiction through business registration statutes.204  
While the court did not say registration statutes could never be 
the basis for general jurisdiction, it seemed to take Daimler to 
the extreme, exemplifying the very arguments Justice Sotomayor 
worried about in her concurrence.205  Brown, a resident of 
Connecticut, brought suit against Lockheed Martin on behalf of 
her father to recover tort injuries sustained from asbestos 
exposure while he was an Air Force airplane mechanic.206  While 
the exposure occurred in Europe and across the United States, it 
did not occur in Connecticut.207 
First, the court ruled that the Connecticut statute at issue 
was not explicit enough and did not “speak to the relationship 
between process so served and the state courts’ jurisdiction.”208  
And while Connecticut courts had previously held that the 
statute in question did confer general jurisdiction,209 those 
rulings were pre-Daimler.210  More importantly, the statute did 
200 See id. at *5. 
201 See id. at *5–6 (discussing King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 576 
(9th Cir. 2011)). 
202 Id. at *6. 
203 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016). 
204 Id. at 622. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. at 623. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 634. 
209 See Talenti v. Morgan & Bro. Manhattan Storage Co., 968 A.2d 933, 940 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2009). 
210 See Brown, 814 F.3d at 639. 
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not “contain express language alerting the potential registrant 
that by complying with the statute . . . it would be agreeing to 
submit to the general jurisdiction of the state courts.”211 
Additionally, the court toed the Daimler line, misconstruing 
decades of general jurisdiction precedent.212  Compared to its 
“substantial activity worldwide,” Lockheed’s Connecticut contacts 
were grossly disproportionate.213  Its contacts, although 
systematic and continuous,214 simply did not reach the level of 
being “essentially at home.”215  And so, while Lockheed has had a 
physical presence in the state for three decades, Connecticut 
lacks general jurisdiction over its activities.216  However, the 
Second Circuit still noted that “a carefully drawn state statute 
that expressly required consent to general jurisdiction as a 
condition on a foreign corporation’s doing business in the state, at 
least in cases brought by state residents, might well be 
constitutional.”217  In other words, all is not lost. 
Thus, in order for courts to validly exercise general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, clear and explicit statutes 
authorizing such jurisdiction must exist.  Without the plain 
language of the statute, courts will be bound by the restrictive 
confines of Daimler and will not be able to exercise general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations when citizens of the state 
seek recourse. 
III. EXPLICIT REGISTRATION STATUTES: A NEW FRONTIER OF AN
OLD TRADITION 
Properly drafted registration statutes, including an explicit 
statement that registering to do business constitutes consent to 
general jurisdiction, are a legitimate means to general 
jurisdiction that should be utilized.  New York has led the way by 
introducing legislation in the State Assembly and State Senate 
providing a proper remedy to the general jurisdiction ailment. 
211 Id. at 636. 
212 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
213 Brown, 814 F.3d at 623. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 628. 
217 Id. at 641. 
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A. New York’s Pending Legislation for Consent-Based
Jurisdiction
In the spring of 2014, concerned about the consequences of
Daimler for decades of New York case law, Chief Administrative 
Judge Gail Prudenti requested that the state legislature amend 
licensure statutes for foreign corporations conducting business in 
New York.218  By June, the legislation was drafted and approved 
by advisory committees.219  The companion bills, Assembly Bill 
9576 and Senate Bill 7078, would amend Business Corporation 
Law (“BCL”) § 1301, and similar statutes, by codifying case law, 
making it unequivocal that a foreign corporation’s application to 
do business in New York constitutes consent to jurisdiction in all 
actions against the corporation.220  While the Assembly bill 
passed on June 2, 2014, the Senate bill only made it through the 
Judiciary Committee before the 2014 session ended.221  However, 
the bill’s sponsor, Senator John Bonacic, reintroduced the bill at 
the beginning of the 2015 session.222  It passed the Judiciary 
Committee with bipartisan support on June 25, 2015 and is 
currently awaiting a floor vote.223 
The 2015 version is identical to the earlier version.224  It 
amends New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, the Business 
Corporation Law, and all related laws to explicitly provide that 
registration to conduct business in New York is the equivalent to 
consenting to the state’s jurisdiction.225  The legislation is not  
218 Alison Frankel, New York’s (Stalled) Grab for Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Businesses, REUTERS (June 30, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/ 
06/30/new-yorks-stalled-grab-for-jurisdiction-over-foreign-businesses. 
219 See id. 
220 Brian J. Farrar, Jurisdiction in New York Courts, FED. B. COUNCIL Q., (Aug. 
21, 2014), http://federalbarcouncilquarterly.org/?p=311. 
221 See Frankel, supra note 218. 
222 Lanier Saperstein, et al., New York State Legislature Seeks to Overturn 
‘Daimler,’ N.Y. L.J.: Outside Counsel (May 20, 2015), http://www.newyorklawj 
ournal.com/id=1202726893242/New-York-State-Legislature-Seeks-to-Overturn-
Daimler. 
223 The vote was 15 in favor, 6 in favor with reservation, and 2 excused. The 
legislators voting in favor of the legislation were both politically and geographically 
diverse. The ayes included Senator Bonacic, a Republican from Orange County; 
Majority Leader Flanagan, a Republican from Nassau County; Senator Avella, a 
Democrat from Queens; and Senator Savino, a member of the Independent-
Democratic Conference from Staten Island/Brooklyn. 
224 See N.Y.S. 4846, 238th Sess. (2015), WL 2015 NY S.B. 4846 (NS). 
225 See id. 
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perfect, but it represents an important step to ensuring that 
state courts have the ability to properly oversee foreign 
corporations. 
First, the bill provides the plain language courts need to rely 
on consent as the means for asserting general jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation.  Second, the statute comports with the long 
history of personal jurisdiction in New York and throughout the 
United States.  Finally, it satisfies an important public interest 
by ensuring states have oversight over corporations that choose 
to conduct business within their borders. 
B. Addressing the Criticism of Consent-Based Jurisdiction
Critics of consent-based jurisdiction founded on registration
statutes focus on three main areas: the fairness, burden, and 
predictability to the defendant; the risk of increasing forum 
shopping; and the risk of “universal jurisdiction.” 
1. Fairness, Burden, Predictability, and Coerced Consent
Critics charge that consent-based jurisdiction is not consent
at all.  Instead, the argument is that registration provides the 
guise of consent, but in reality acts as a gun to the head, forcing 
corporations to enter a contractual relationship.226  This coercion, 
critics contend, leads to limited fairness, substantial burdens, 
and rampant unpredictability for defendant corporations.227  
However, these concerns can be alleviated by carefully drafting 
the registration statutes granting jurisdiction. 
Fairness based on explicit authority is within the realm of 
due process.  That explicit authority must be expressed in clear 
statutory language.  Once specific language is inserted into the 
statutory scheme, notice is provided to corporations, thus 
fulfilling due process requirements.  In fact, a large part of the 
debate has involved the specific language of the legislation.  For 
example, opponents of the proposed New York legislation have 
been primarily concerned with specific language, not necessarily 
226 See Monestier, supra note 15, at 1387. 
227 See Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and 
the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2003); Monestier, 
supra note 15, at 1402 (arguing that registration statutes as a means to general 
jurisdiction fails “common sense” by granting “universal jurisdiction”). 
2017] EMERGING FROM DAIMLER’S SHADOW 239
the theory of general jurisdiction itself.228  The New York City 
Bar Association Committee on Banking, while also raising 
constitutional concerns,229 lobbied to amend the language of the 
bill to exclude banks.230  Therefore, the debate is focused on 
which, if any, groups of corporations should be excluded from the 
revised jurisdictional reach.231 
Further establishing fairness, the proposed statute comports 
with the long history of personal jurisdiction broadly, as well as 
general jurisdiction, because it respects a contractual 
relationship.  Since International Shoe, the underpinning of 
personal jurisdiction has been the “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”232  Moreover, since Bagdon and Tauza, 
New York has emphasized the important contractual 
relationship between a foreign corporation and the forum state.233  
Both values are achieved by this legislation because corporations 
are put on notice while simultaneously being forced to 
acknowledge the agreement. 
The importance of this contractual relationship has been a 
foundational democratic political value,234 and the fairness 
factors emphasized in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are 
achieved through honoring that tradition.235  Further, states have 
228 See Letter from John J. Clarke, Jr., Chairman, N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. 
on Banking, to Hon. Bonacic & Hon. Weinstein, N.Y.C. B. Assoc. Committee on 
Banking L., (April 9, 2014). 
229 The Committee argued that the legislation violates the Due Process Clause 
and Commerce Clause, and cited three district court opinions since Daimler, but 
ignored other cases that have disagreed with its position. Id. 
230 See id. Of course, other incentives could be the basis for the committee’s 
concerns considering its special interest representing the banking industry. 
However, banks make up an important class of corporation that demands state 
jurisdictional oversight. See, e.g., Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 91 F. Supp. 3d 561 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
231 Likely, no groups of corporations should be excluded, but that is a debate for 
the floor of the New York State Senate. 
232 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
233 See discussion supra Section I.B.1; see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 
746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377321, at *28 (arguing that within the “broad 
limits” of Due Process, “a State has latitude to provide for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on the basis of someone else’s direct or physical 
contacts with the State”). 
234 See Michalski, supra note 26, at 164. 
235 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 423 
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that as “active participants” in commerce, 
corporations have an obligation to be amenable to “suit in any forum that is 
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a responsibility to treat foreign corporations the same as 
domestic corporations, holding both to the same regulatory 
standards.236  In fact, Justice Ginsburg suggested that an 
exceptional circumstance under Daimler could arise if the foreign 
corporation was “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that 
state.”237  Equality is all that is sought. 
Finally, jurisdiction as a means of ensuring corporate 
accountability becomes even more necessary as we become an 
increasingly globalized world, connected in all aspects of 
economic life.238  Granting states more autonomy and authority 
in jurisdiction should be encouraged because it ensures increased 
corporate accountability.239  In fact, the purpose of statutes such 
as New York’s Business Corporation Law is to regulate foreign 
corporations and put them on equal footing with their in-state 
counterparts.240 
The proposed legislation also satisfies predictability 
concerns.241  The Daimler majority worried that, in an 
increasingly international world, it would be unfair to force 
corporations to defend themselves in multiple forums because 
there would be no way to predict where they might be sued.242  
However, under a consent-based framework, a foreign  
significantly affected by the corporation’s commercial activities.”); see also Michalski, 
supra note 26, at 185 (arguing that submitting to jurisdiction is a “political 
obligation” of corporations). 
236 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (concluding that under the court’s framework, a U.S. business that 
enters a contract with an international corporation that subsequently breaches may 
not be able to seek relief in U.S. courts). 
237 See id. at 758 n.11 (majority opinion) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). 
238 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (a fundamental growth 
in the national economy has made the expansion of state jurisdiction permissible). 
239 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 423 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Barriere 
v. Juluca, No. 12–23510–CIV, 2014 WL 652831, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (arguing
that restricting jurisdiction “would effectively deprive American citizens from
litigating in the United States”).
240 Reese v. Harper Surface Finishing Sys., 129 A.D.2d 159, 162, 517 N.Y.S.2d 
522, 524 (2d Dep’t 1987) (noting that B.C.L. § 1312 was enacted to ensure that 
foreign corporations were not given an unfair advantage over in-state corporations). 
241 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762–63. 
242 Id. at 761–62. 
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corporation could readily predict where it might be sued: in any 
forum where it had registered to do business under a clear and 
explicit registration statute.243 
Additionally, foreign corporations would not be overly 
burdened by having to defend themselves in multiple 
jurisdictions.  As the Ninth Circuit explained, international 
corporations would not be disadvantaged due to the breadth of 
their business.244  Moreover, while litigation in a foreign forum 
may be an inconvenience for international corporations, that is 
part of the bargain.245  Therefore, a registration statute with 
explicit language of consent satisfies traditional notions of 
fairness, and also recognizes the value of strong contractual 
relationships that have been essential to our history of personal 
jurisdiction. 
2. Risk of Forum Shopping
Critics of registration statutes as consent to general
jurisdiction have argued that such actions represent the “last 
bastion[] of forum shopping.”246  Forum shopping is the process by 
which a plaintiff may search for a favorable, if arbitrary, forum 
in which to bring claims.  Critics argue that if all states exercised 
consent-based jurisdiction, there would be a free-for-all of 
plaintiffs busily shopping around for the best forum.247  This 
argument is not persuasive for two reasons.  First, “forum 
243 See id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing “there is nothing 
unpredictable about a rule” that subjects corporations to general jurisdiction in each 
state where they have substantial contacts); see also Von Mehren & Trautman, 
supra note 17, at 1138 (noting jurisdiction based on consent is easily administered 
and “relatively precise”). 
244 See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 925 (9th Cir. 2011), 
rev’d sub nom., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); see also McGee v. Int’l 
Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) (determining that litigating in a foreign forum 
may be inconvenient, but it is not a denial of due process). 
245 See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 538, 227 N.E.2d 851, 
854, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (1967) (arguing that while litigation in a foreign forum may 
be burdensome, “it is part of the price which may properly be demanded of those who 
extensively engage in international trade . . . . [Corporations] receive considerable 
benefits from such foreign business and may not be heard to complain about the 
burdens”). 
246 See Monestier, supra note 15, at 1413; see also Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for 
Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) (calling 
forum shopping the “most disfavored practice”). 
247 Selecting the best forum could be based on liberal statutes of limitation, 
beneficial tort or contract laws, or favorable juries or demographics. 
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shopping” has never been the epidemic critics feared, even in the 
years before Daimler.  Second, restricting general jurisdiction is 
not the best way to combat frivolous suits being brought in 
favorable forums. 
First, forum shopping is not the evil critics have warned 
against.248  Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed forum shopping as 
a “litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs,”249 while Judge 
Widener of the Fourth Circuit noted, “[t]here is nothing 
inherently evil about forum-shopping.”250  Instead, forum 
shopping, despite the negative label, should be considered 
dedicated advocacy,251 fundamentally embedded in the American 
legal tradition.252  The concern should not be forum shopping for 
its own sake, as some commentators would have it, but unfair 
“advantage-seeking activit[ies].”253  In the realm of consent-based 
jurisdiction, benign forum shopping may result, but malignant 
forum shopping would not. 
Moreover, even if forum shopping generally were a cause for 
concern, the more important concern is whether plaintiffs are 
able to bring suit in their home states at all.  These plaintiffs 
have no need to forum shop; litigation in their home forum is 
convenient enough. Therefore, the need to address forum 
shopping is not as related to fairness to the defendant as some 
critics insist. 
Finally, the best solution to address malignant forum 
shopping is not to constrict jurisdiction, but to encourage judicial 
gate keeping.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens, whereby a 
court may determine that it is not the best forum for the pending 
248 See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1695 
(1990) (concluding that forum shopping is not simply “an evil to be avoided” and 
safeguards exist to prevent abuses). 
249 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). 
250 See Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987). 
251 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 
TUL. L. REV. 553, 573 (1989); see also Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Micron 
Semiconductors, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 994, 996 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (“In reality, every 
litigant who files a lawsuit engages in forum shopping when he chooses a place to 
file suit.”). 
252 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1509 (1995) (“The American way is to provide 
plaintiffs with a wide choice of venues.”); Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum 
Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82 (2014). 
253 See Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong with That?, 24 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 33 (2005); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 
527 (1990). 
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litigation, is the more appropriate tool.254  Restricting general 
jurisdiction risks preventing plaintiffs from having their day in 
court, and registration statutes work to provide convenience for a 
plaintiff to bring suit in their home forum.  At the same time, by 
utilizing forum non conveniens,255 courts can still ensure fairness 
to defendant corporations.256 
In conclusion, the forum shopping criticism of consent-based 
jurisdiction is merely a fiction premised on the ill-founded and 
outmoded apprehension of forum shopping in general. 
3. Universal Jurisdiction
To hold a state amenable to suit in multiple forums is not
“universal jurisdiction,” it is simply the same jurisdiction we 
have always had.257  In fact, it is Daimler that departed from 
settled historical precedent.  For generations, jurisdiction has 
been premised on the relationship between the corporation and 
the forum state, not on the relationship between the corporation 
and other states or countries.258  Now, the Court has abandoned 
decades of precedent in order to restrict jurisdiction, just as 
Justice Black warned in his International Shoe concurring 
opinion.259  Indeed, even Justice Ginsburg warned about the 
dangers of limiting jurisdiction too strictly, only three years 
before Daimler.260  To ignore precedent and historical practice is  
254 See Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and 
the Judicial Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping 
Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 141, 142 (1998). 
255 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft 
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.23 (1981). 
256 See Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). 
257 Universal jurisdiction refers to foreign corporations being hauled in to any 
court among the fifty states. See supra Section III.B.1 for a discussion on Fairness, 
Burden, Predictability, and Coerced Consent. 
258 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 768 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (noting precedent has developed from “the concept of reciprocal 
fairness”); see also Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Linda Greenhouse, A Conversation 
with Justice Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 375, 386 (2014) (“The Court 
announced a rule limiting the test for general jurisdiction on a set of facts that were 
the worst for the exercise of jurisdiction.”). 
259 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (Black, J., 
concurring) (quoting Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
260 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893–94 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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not only inconsistent with constitutional theory, it “creates 
divergent bodies of case law,” resulting in further confusion for 
future plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.261 
Additionally, allowing states to exercise general jurisdiction 
through registration statutes would leave the discretion to do so 
in the hands of the individual states.  Some states may choose 
not to enact such statutes.  For example, Delaware’s pro-
corporate climate may make it undesirable for the state’s 
legislature to pass such a statute.  Moreover, Delaware would be 
an exceptional case because so many corporations are also 
incorporated there, making those corporations amenable to suit 
under Daimler’s framework alone.  However, states in which 
many corporations have a large presence, but in which few are 
actually incorporated, face an unfair disadvantage in meaningful 
oversight.  Therefore, the risk of “universal jurisdiction” is not 
much of a risk at all. 
C. Improving the New York Legislation
The proposed New York registration statute is not perfect.
While it provides plain language that courts have always relied 
on to exercise general jurisdiction, it could still be more explicit. 
Moreover, a presence analysis should be added to ensure fairness 
to defendant corporations. 
As Chief Judge Cardozo expressed at the dawn of New York’s 
tradition of consent-based jurisdiction, establishing general 
jurisdiction based on a registration statute is about construing a 
contract.262  The bargained-for exchange between the state and 
the corporation should be clearly defined.  While the language of 
the proposed New York statute is strong, it should be more 
explicit.  For example, the statute never mentions “general 
jurisdiction,” but instead declares that registration “constitutes 
consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for all actions 
against such corporation.”263  In order to remove any question as 
to the extent courts may rely on the statute, language should be 
added clarifying that the cause of action against the corporation 
261 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 89, at 161; see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 
at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court adopts a new rule of constitutional 
law that is unmoored from decades of precedent.”). 
262 See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 438, 111 N.E. 
1075, 1077 (1916). 
263 See N.Y.S. 4846, 238th Sess. (2015), WL 2015 NY S.B. 4846 (NS). 
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need not arise within the state.264  This provision would make 
clear to the corporation that registration to do business in New 
York is consent to the general jurisdiction of her courts. 
Additionally, consent to jurisdiction through a registration 
statute does not automatically remove the need for judicial 
inquiry into the corporation’s contacts with the state.265  
Minimum contacts with the state are still an important element 
despite the registration to do business.266  For instance, if a 
corporation registers to do business in New York, but never 
actually conducts any business there, it would not be fair to 
subject the corporation to general jurisdiction.  To paraphrase 
the Ninth Circuit, dipping a toe in New York waters is not 
enough.267  The corporation must have sufficient affiliation with 
the state such that there is “political consent” for the exercise of 
jurisdiction.268  Actually conducting business within the state is 
enough to make a corporation an insider, separate and distinct 
from incorporation or domicile.269  An evaluation of reasonable 
jurisdiction is thus based on the relationship formed between 
state and corporation.270  Therefore, the same evaluation used by 
Chief Judge Cardozo is embraced:  Is the corporation here?271  If 
it has consented to jurisdiction in exchange for doing business, 
and is actually doing business, general jurisdiction may be 
exercised. 
264 For example, the amended proposal would read: “A foreign corporation’s 
application for authority to do business in this state, whenever filed, constitutes 
consent to the general jurisdiction of the courts of this state for all actions against 
such corporation, occurring within or outside of the state.” 
265 See King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Mere 
appointment of an agent for service of process cannot serve as a talismanic coupon to 
bypass [minimum contacts].”). 
266 See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
267 King, 632 F.3d at 572. The “toe” in King was the appointment of an agent for 
the service of process, as required by Montana statute. Id. In this case, the same 
rationale would apply for the registration to do business. 
268 See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989); Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a 
Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of 
Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 28 (1998). 
269 See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitation on State 
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87. 
270 See Cebik, supra note 268, at 24. 
271 See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 268–69, 115 N.E. 915, 918 
(1917). 
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CONCLUSION 
Today, we protect multibillion dollar foreign corporations 
from any inconvenience, preferring to make plaintiffs forego a 
bite of the apple.  That cannot be the intention of Daimler.  For 
decades, the Constitution was generally interpreted to respect a 
state’s autonomy to determine the extent of its jurisdiction over 
those corporations that choose to enter its borders, conduct 
business, and take advantage of its laws.  Suddenly, the Daimler 
decision has called into doubt decades of precedent.  Consent-
based jurisdiction derived from a registration to do business 
statute remedies the unintended consequences of Daimler. 
For many recent commentators, it is easier to simply dismiss 
consent-based jurisdiction as outside the bounds of modern 
doctrine.  But what about the Utah family that is denied relief 
from a corporation hiding behind its foreign veil?  What about a 
consumer defrauded by an international manufacturer that may 
be “too big” to be hauled into court?  These concerns cannot be 
simply flicked away.  A properly drafted consent-based 
registration statute addresses the legitimate concerns of Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence without going beyond the scope of the 
Daimler ruling. 
